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can explain the misperception that led to
the error. Another close example is the
use of 0% correlation in setting themotion
direction of the random dots, a condition
that leaves the monkey completely free to
decide what movement he has seen. This
study is probably the first one usingmusci-
mol in an attempt to impair SEF function in
a task involving visual pursuit. In contrast
to surgical lesions, the blockage of func-
tion induced by an injection of muscimol
remains temporary. Compensation does
not occur immediately. This allows the
authors to witness pursuit deficits specifi-
cally attributable to SEF impairment.
More generally, it may be worth con-
sidering what single-unit analysis, as
exemplified by Shichinohe et al., can offer
when compared to modern techniques
of brain imaging. Very likely, the presence
of any of the active types of neuron
described by these authors would be
sufficient to illuminate the SEF region.
This illumination would thus indicate that
this region is involved in the task, but it
would not tell us why or how it is involved.
Brain imaging is usable in humans. It also
has the advantage of marking all regions
that are involved, at least at some stage,
in the execution of a task. In contrast,
microelectrode unit recording focuses
on a single region, but it exposes with
high resolution the details of how it oper-
ates. The combination of these two
approaches is giving us a formidable
tool to understand the brain.
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In this issue of Neuron, Boorman and colleagues shed new light on the roles of lateral frontopolar and
ventromedial prefrontal cortices in task switching and decision making.A Nightingale, sitting aloft upon an
oak, was seen by a Hawk, who
made a swoop down, and seized
him. The Nightingale earnestly be-
sought the Hawk to let him go,
saying that he was not big enough
to satisfy the hunger of a Hawk,
who ought to pursue the larger
birds. The Hawk said: ‘‘I should
indeed have lost my senses if I
should let go food ready to my
hand, for the sake of pursuing birds
which are not yet evenwithin sight.’’
—Aesop’s Fables: A New Re-
visedVersion fromOriginal Sources
(translator not identified), 1884
So goes the fable of Aesop, versions
of which have been transmitted around
the world for over 2500 years. Indeed,a bird in the hand is worth two in the
bush—unless, perhaps, the probability of
catching the birds in the bush is very high.
In a dynamic environment, it is adaptive
to monitor the possible outcomes associ-
ated with alternative courses of action
and to update our behavior accordingly.
In the current issue ofNeuron, Boorman,
Behrens,Woolrich, andRushworthprovide
compelling evidence for a neural mecha-
nismbywhich thismonitoringof alternative
outcomes relative to current outcomes,
and the subsequent updating of behavior,
can occur (Boorman et al., 2009). In parti-
cular, they show that our brains can keep
track of the mounting evidence in favor
of an alternative course of action, and
that—when strong enough—this signal
leads to a switch in behavior. The evidence
favoring a switch to an alternative choice isNeurotracked by lateral fronopolar cortex (FPC),
and this information appears to be trans-
mitted to the inferior parietal sulcus area
(IPS) and ventral premotor cortex (PMv)
in advance of a behavioral switch. By
contrast, the immediate relative value of
the current choice is encoded by ventro-
medial PFC (vmPFC).
The approach of Boorman and col-
leagues was to combine a very simple
decision-making task with sophisticated
mathematical modeling and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in
humans. Participants selected one of
two responses (a left or right button press)
on every trial. The potential reward for
each option was shown, and these re-
wards varied randomly from trial to trial.
The probability of reward for each option
was unknown but could be estimatedn 62, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 609
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these probabilities were generated by
a Bayesian model that tracked the long-
term probability of each option, as well
as the volatility of these probability esti-
mates, based on observed outcomes. By
manipulating reward values on the basis
of prior selections, the value associated
with an option (i.e., probability 3 reward)
was made to be independent of reward
probability. As such, the authors were
able to separate long-term probability
estimates associated with competing
options from the immediate value compu-
tations that drive decision making.
This important study has several main
findings. First, activation in bilateral FPC
tracks the probability that the unchosen
option will be rewarded, relative to the
probability that the chosen option will be
rewarded—i.e.,the relativeunchosenprob-
ability. Critically, when FPC activation
between trials was high, it was likely that
a participant would switch from one
option to the other on the subsequent
trial. In addition to these within-subject
correlationsbetweenactivationandchoice
behavior, the authors found significant,
albeit more modest, between-subject
correlations, such that subjects with
greater FPC engagement for relative un-
chosen probability were more likely to
make advantageous switches. Based on
these findings, the authors conclude that
FPC keeps track of the cumulative evi-
dence in favor of a switch in behavior.
The experiment was set up such that
tracking the probability of reward for
each response was useful for decision
making, whereas tracking reward magni-
tudes from trial to trial was not. It is there-
fore an open question whether or not FPC
would track average reward if the task
were modified to make this variable rele-
vant. If FPC were shown to track average
reward as well as probability, then this
would strongly support the general con-
clusion that this region tracks the relative
advantage of switching, rather than the
more narrow interpretation that it only
tracks reward probabilities.
Like FPC, the IPS was engaged by rela-
tive unchosen probability, but only on
switch trials, in which the previously un-
chosen option becomes the chosen one.
This finding suggests that the signal pro-
viding evidence for a switch arises in
FPC and is transmitted to the IPS. Consis-610 Neuron 62, June 11, 2009 ª2009 Elsevtent with this idea, right IPS and right
premotor cortex demonstrate increasing
functional connectivity with FPC with
increasing relative unchosen probability
on switch trials. These findings provide
insight into a brain mechanism whereby
behavior can be updated flexibly in re-
sponse to a changing environment.
The authors provide evidence for two
distinct neural signals: one produced by
FPC that provides evidence in favor of
thealternativeoutcomeandoneproduced
by vmPFC that encodes the value (imme-
diate reward 3 long-term probability) of
the chosen option relative to that of the
unchosen option (i.e., ‘‘relative chosen
value’’). That vmPFC tracks value has
been shown before (Hare et al., 2008),
but the finding that this signal is relative
(chosen value minus unchosen value) is
novel. The authors argue convincingly
that vmPFC encodes the value-based
evidence in favor of the selected option
over the course of multiple decisions.
These intriguing results provide fresh
insights into the neural mechanisms of
decision making and especially into the
function of FPC, a region that has received
intense scrutiny over the last few years.
Boorman and colleagues’ findings are
consistentwith the idea that FPCaccumu-
lates evidence in favor of switching and
then with sufficient evidence provides a
signal to indicate that switching should
occur.
To situate these findings relative to
prior studies of FPC, the authors suggest
that this region plays a more general role
in representing pending or alternative
courses of action. In other words, FPC
may encode the alternative option and
not simply the evidence for it. In this
case, the representation of a favored
option would involve greater neural
activity than the representation of a less
favored option. The possibility that FPC
represents alternative options is broadly
consistent with theories on multitasking
and prospectivememory, which posit that
FPC stores information that is needed for
later performance (Koechlin and Hyafil,
2007; Burgess et al., 2003).
An alternative account of lateral fronto-
polar function posits that this region is
involved in the joint consideration or inte-
gration of distinct mental representations
(Christoff et al., 2001; Ramnani andOwen,
2004). Studies involving Raven’s Progres-ier Inc.sive Matrices, relational matching tasks,
propositional analogies, and transitive
inference problems have shown that
FPC is more active on trials that require
integration or comparison of two relations
between sets of mental representations
relative to the separate consideration of
two such relations (Christoff et al., 2001;
Bunge et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2007;
Wendelken and Bunge, 2009). A role in
the comparison of distinct representa-
tions can also account for FPC activation
in studies in which a mental representa-
tion must be evaluated according to
specific criteria, as in episodic memory
judgments. It should be noted that rela-
tional integration, as well as episodic
retrieval, typically involves only lateral
frontopolar cortex, whereas multitasking
frequently activates more medial parts of
the frontal pole (Gilbert et al., 2006). In
the current experiment, FPC can be inter-
preted as engaging in the active compar-
ison of competing response options. A
comparison process would be expected
to intensify as the evidence for switch-
ing increases, and a comparator circuit
should interact with other brain regions
involved in switching, just as an evidence
accumulator would. Whether or not this
interpretation is accurate, the present
findings should lead to the refinement of
various accounts of FPC function.
Given the evidence of strong functional
connectivity between FPC and IPS in the
present study, as well as in a study of
exploration versus exploitation in decision
making (Daw et al., 2006), and in our own
research, it is reasonable to ask whether
there might be a direct anatomical
connection between these regions in
humans. Boorman and colleagues note
the evidence for a lack of connection
between medial frontopolar cortex and
parietal cortex in macaque monkeys and
speculate that the connection between
FPC and IPS may be mediated by PMv
or by dorsolateral PFC. However, the
possibility of a direct anatomical con-
nection should not be discounted, given
the identification of a new subregion of
Brodmann area 10 in humans relative to
nonhuman primates (Ongu¨r et al., 2003)
and the marked differences in activation
profiles of FPC as compared with medial
frontopolar cortex (Gilbert et al., 2006).
Perhaps the strengthening of connections
between FPC and IPS in humans
Neuron
Previewscontributes to the uniquely human
capacity for flexibly updating behavior as
a function of changing environmental
context (Stoet and Snyder, 2003).
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